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Abstract
Th e goal of this research was to identify factors that account 
for procedural and substantive inequality in implementing 
asylum law. Th e decisions of ninety-eight caseworkers of the 
Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service on an asy-
lum application were related to their answers on a question-
naire. Caseworkers diff er in the extent of available informa-
tion on an asylum application they take for granted and in 
their fi nal decisions on it. Th ese diff erences result from work 
pressure, the caseworkers’ reputation, their role defi nition, 
political opinion, and professional background, and policy. 
Intensifying feedback and decreasing work pressure can 
achieve more consistent and careful decisions.
Résumé
Le but de cette étude était d’identifi er les facteurs responsa-
bles pour les inégalités de fond ainsi que des inégalités rela-
tives à la procédure dans l’application de la loi sur le droit 
d’asile. Les décisions de quatre-vingt dix-huit agents chargés 
du cas du Service néerlandais pour l’immigration et la na-
turalisation concernant une demande d’asile furent reliées 
à leurs réponses à un questionnaire. Les agents chargés du 
cas diff èrent sur la somme d’information dont ils disposent 
concernant une demande d’asile qu’ils tiennent pour acquis 
et aussi dans leurs décisions fi nales concernant la même de-
mande. Ces diff érences sont causées par la tension au tra-
vail, la réputation de l’agent chargé du cas, leur défi nition 
de leur rôle, leurs opinions politiques, leurs antécédents pro-
fessionnels et les politiques en place. Accroître la rétroaction 
et faire baisser la tension au travail aideront à atteindre des 
décisions plus cohérentes et consciencieuses.
Introduction
Th e predominant opinion in the literature on the imple-
mentation of law is that the translation of general laws in 
decisions about specifi c cases unavoidably leaves room for 
choices.1 Th is is called discretion. On the one hand, the free-
dom of choice enables offi  cials to individualize decisions. 
Th is means that they can take into account more characteris-
tics of a case than are formally relevant. On the other hand, it 
can lead to inequality before the law. Th is means that offi  cials 
decide diff erently on comparable cases. Inequality before the 
law can refer either to the decision procedure or to the sub-
stance of the decision.2
Th e best way to study the individualization of decisions is 
to ask the same offi  cials to decide upon diff erent cases that are 
formally identical, but that diff er in other respects. In this way 
it is possible to fi nd out, for example, whether they are more 
likely to grant a disablement benefi t for a sick breadwinner 
with years of work experience than for an inexperienced sin-
gle person with the identical sickness. Th e relation between 
the use of discretion and inequality before the law can best be 
studied by asking diff erent offi  cials to decide on one identical 
case. Th en it is clear from the start that all eventual diff erent 
outcomes are unrelated to the legitimacy of the application 
itself. Th is paper is directed exclusively to the inequality be-
fore the law that can result from the use of discretion. Th e 
goal is to fi nd causes of procedural and substantive inequal-
ity. For this reason ninety-eight offi  cials responsible for the 
implementation of asylum policy in the Netherlands—so-
called decision employees—were presented an identical fi c-
titious asylum application and were asked what they would 
decide on it.3 Subsequently, these answers were connected to 
their answers on a questionnaire.
Th e implementation of asylum policy is a suitable sub-
ject for fi nding out how discretion results in procedural and 
substantive inequality. On the one hand, previous research 
has already demonstrated that both forms of inequality are 
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no exception in relation to the implementation of asylum 
policy. Regarding procedural inequality, Smit4 has shown, 
for example, that decision employees indeed only request a 
test to establish the age of minor asylum seekers if there are 
serious doubts about the stated age, but that in some cases 
where there were also well-founded reasons to doubt, no age 
test was requested. Quite a few others have shown that the 
implementation of asylum policy results in substantive in-
equality before the law as well. At the level of nations,5 states 
(i.e., cantons),6 regions,7 asylum-seekers centres,8 and indi-
vidual professionals,9 similar or even identical asylum ap-
plications have diff erent outcomes. On the other hand, little 
is known about the causes of both forms of inequality.10 In 
other words, it is well known that the implementation of asy-
lum policy results in both forms of inequality but it is hardly 
known what causes them. Th e goal of this study is to reveal 
some particular causes.
Explanations were sought in the working conditions of 
the decision employees, and in their personal characteris-
tics. Explanations regarding the institutional context were 
not taken into account because data were only collected 
systematically at the level of the individual employees. Th e 
next section is about the hypotheses. Th en follows section 
three about the collection of the data, the research design, 
the operationalization, and the analytic strategy. Section four 
is about the results, and the fi nal section is about conclusions 
and recommendations.
Th eory and Hypotheses
Procedural Inequality
According to Lipsky,11 offi  cials—“street-level bureaucrats”—
are unable to do justice to the specifi c characteristics of indi-
vidual cases because they are chronically plagued by a lack of 
time. In order to deal with the continuous fl ow of new cases, 
street-level bureaucrats oft en accept incomplete information 
and information that clients deliver themselves because the 
collecting of missing information and of information gath-
ered independently of the interested party is usually diffi  cult 
and time-consuming.
However, the fact that the shortage of time is inherent 
in the work of street-level bureaucrats does, of course, not 
imply that they all suff er of it to the same extent. Th erefore, 
diff erences in work pressure could cause variation in the ex-
tent to which they are prepared to decide on the basis of in-
complete or client-dependent information. Th ere are indeed 
several indications that offi  cials are more willing to accept 
the information that is present about a case as they are under 
more work pressure: time constraints encourage immigrant 
inspectors to rely on simplifying categories when questioning 
travellers12 and social workers take fewer cues into account 
when dealing with accusations of elder mistreatment as the 
caseload of the county in which they work is higher.13 So, 
the expectation is that offi  cials who are responsible for the 
implementation of asylum policy are more willing to accept 
the obtainable information on an asylum application as they 
perceive more work pressure (hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, 
it can be expected that especially newer employees perceive 
a lot of work pressure (hypotheses 1b). Usually the most im-
portant task of offi  cials is to make decisions on individual 
cases and since newer employees are still learning to do the 
job they may need more time to make a decision than experi-
enced employees.
Th e second reason why offi  cials might diff er is the extent 
to which they take for granted the information that is present 
about a case refers to the quality of their reputation. When 
making actual decisions, employees take into account their 
experiences with previous cases—their so-called prior know-
ledge.14 Th is means that decisions about individual cases 
cannot be seen in isolation from the outcomes of previous 
ones: “Decision-makers, then, do not see and treat cases as 
self-contained, isolated entities, but rather as practical tasks 
embedded in known and foreseeable courses of institutional 
actions.”15 Administrators use their experience with the out-
come of previous decisions in particular to protect their own 
reputation and that of their organization.16 Th is means that 
they try to gain recognition for their decisions and to prevent 
them from being overturned. Employees who have been suc-
cessful in this respect in the past are expected to have the 
least problems with taking for granted the information that is 
available about a case. Aft er all, they have received few signals 
that this has decreased the carefulness of their decisions. Th is 
means that it is to be expected that decision makers are more 
inclined to live with the available information on an asylum 
application as they have a better reputation (hypotheses 2).
Substantive Inequality
Diff erences in the extent to which caseworkers take for 
granted the disposable information on an application refers 
to procedural inequality. Th ose who decide not to take it for 
granted will eventually base their decisions on diff erent data 
then those who do. Aft er all, only the former decide to com-
plement or verify the information on hand. Subsequently, 
how can these diff erences in their fi nal decisions be ex-
plained?
Researchers oft en mention the importance of role defi n-
ition. Most street-level bureaucrats are primarily responsible 
for the distribution of scarce resources to fulfi ll the needs of 
clients. Several researchers have demonstrated that this re-
sponsibility is related to role confl icts. Some emphasize the 
importance of controlling the distribution of scarce resour-
ces, while others give more priority to fulfi lling the needs of 
clients. Th ese two types of employees are oft en distinguished. 
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For example, “hard-liners” are opposed to “soft -liners,”17 
“gatekeepers” to “advocates,”18 and “bureaucrats” to “profes-
sionals.”19 Among Canadian20 and British21 immigration of-
fi cials one also fi nds “gatekeepers” and “facilitators,” respect-
ively “doves” and “hawks.”
Researchers who mention role defi nition refer to at least 
one of the following fi ve attitudes: preferring either a restrict-
ive or lenient policy, defi ning a role as gatekeeper, defi ning a 
role as client advocate, doubting the integrity of clients, and, 
fi nally, formalism. Th e fact that role defi nition has diff er-
ent defi nitions suggests that this concept consists of a com-
plex of related attitudes that provide a coherent vision—or 
“theory-in-use”22—about the preferred implementation of 
policy. Th e expectation is that “hard-liners” combine a pref-
erence for a restrictive policy with doubts about the integrity 
of clients, with a formalistic work attitude, and with giving 
high priority to their role as gatekeeper and low priority to 
their role of client advocate; while “soft -liners” take the op-
posite position in all respects. One question addressed in the 
present study was whether these fi ve attitudes indeed form a 
coherent theory-in-use.
Although some researchers doubt that role defi nition real-
ly infl uences decisions,23 this has been demonstrated to be 
the case in many policy domains. Examples refer to disable-
ment benefi ts,24 fi nancial provisions on divorce,25, labour 
permits,26 provision of housing,27 and public assistance.28 
Nagi suggests that the impact of individual attitudes on the 
implementation of policy is greater as the general public 
debate about the stinginess or open-handedness of service 
organizations increases.29 Th e more oft en personnel are con-
fronted with contradictory social norms the more they are 
forced to depend upon their own convictions. If Nagi is right, 
then role defi nition should certainly have an eff ect on the im-
plementation of asylum policy. Th e Dutch Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (IND) has been criticized frequent-
ly by both supporters and opponents of restricting asylum 
policy, with the result that its personnel think that they can 
never do the right thing in the eyes of the media, politicians, 
or pressure groups.30 Because of the contradictory demands 
of the social environment regarding the implementation of 
asylum policy, it is to be expected that the preference for a 
lenient asylum policy results in granting permits (hypothesis 
3a).
However, it is not likely that role defi nition comes out of 
the clear blue sky. Decision makers not only do their job, but 
also take part in society more broadly as citizens. Moreover, 
they bring their professional background to their work. Both 
can infl uence their role defi nition. According to Stone,31 
both a person’s work experience and the nature of his or her 
profession32 are relevant factors of professional background. 
Experienced co-workers, so-called “agency veterans,” would 
be more cynical about clients than would newer employees, 
either because experience makes it easier to recognize cheat-
ing clients or because employees become frustrated about the 
limited possibilities that bureaucratic organizations general-
ly off er to meet the needs of clients. In relation to the nature 
of one’s profession, Stone contrasts people who work within 
the judicial system to caregivers. Th e former are more likely 
to have a negative attitude towards clients because they are 
regularly confronted with the darker side of human nature 
and because they are used to treating people as potential sus-
pects.33 Caregivers usually have a positive attitude towards 
clients because in their work aff ective values such as helping 
and looking aft er people are stimulated. If men are indeed 
socialized through their profession, as Stone maintains, then 
this ought to have a lasting eff ect on their role defi nition. In 
other words, if caseworkers have worked within the judicial 
system or as caregivers of asylum seekers, then this should 
still be noticeable in their present role defi nition as case-
worker. So, it is to be expected that inexperienced employees 
(hypothesis 3b), people without a professional history within 
the judicial system (hypothesis 3c), and decision makers who 
have worked as asylum-seeker aid workers (hypothesis 3d) 
are most in favour of a lenient asylum policy.
With respect to the infl uence of political convictions on 
role defi nition, Stone34 emphasizes the importance of con-
servatism and of fear of economic deterioration (status anx-
iety). Both would result in a negative attitude towards clients. 
Conservatives take a negative stand because they emphasize 
the importance of civil duties, while clients make an appeal to 
civil rights.35 Perceived economic threat causes a negative at-
titude because the status position of civil servants deteriorates 
in comparison to citizens who get help. Among the general 
population, fear of economic deterioration and conservatism 
also result in the preference for a restrictive immigration 
policy.36 People who are fearful of economic deterioration 
oppose immigration because they fear that this will deplete 
social services and will increase competition in the job mar-
ket. In the case of conservatism, it is the conviction that the 
lack of commonly held norms and values undermines social 
cohesion. Because of this, it is to be expected that conserva-
tism (hypothesis 3e) and perceived economic threat (hypoth-
esis 3f) lead to disapproval of a lenient asylum policy.
Finally, substantive inequality might be caused by the 
reputation of the decision maker. A predictable hypothesis is 
that employees get more freedom of choice as their reputation 
is better. Th is would mean that the personal attitude towards 
the carrying out of asylum policy has more eff ect on the 
eventual decision as the reputation of the caseworker is bet-
ter (hypothesis 4a). Next, there are indications that the infl u-
ence of the reputation depends on the context. For example, 
Scott did an experiment in which he asked students to take 
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the role of a caseworker and to make a decision on a request 
for public assistance.37 Contrary to his expectation students 
who were told that a superior would check their decisions did 
not make more consistent decisions than those who were not 
told so but simply refused more oft en. According to Scott the 
reason for this was that the students only had to account for 
their positive decisions. Th e certitude that only grants of pub-
lic assistance were scrutinized by superiors encouraged re-
spondents to refuse public assistance. Fleurke and de Vries38 
showed that, under other conditions, the wish to protect 
one’s own reputation can inversely also lead to granting. Th is 
would be especially likely to occur when the clients of street-
level bureaucracies are organized well. In this case, offi  cials 
run the risk that their refusals will be attacked. Th ese fi ndings 
indicate that offi  cials accommodate their decisions with the 
risks involved for themselves. Th ose who have a reputation 
for being too restrictive especially run a risk when they refuse, 
while the reverse is true for the employees who are known for 
their leniency. Th is leads to the expectation that caseworkers 
grant a permit more oft en as their reputation for being too 
restrictive is stronger, while the reverse is true for those with a 
reputation for being too lenient (hypothesis 4b).
Data, Research Design, Operationalization, and 
Analytic Strategy
Data
During the collection of the data in the fall of 2002, the im-
plementation of asylum policy was spread over fi ve regions 
of the Netherlands and, within the regions, over one or more 
units. Selections have been made at both levels. Originally, 
the intent was to restrict the project at the regional level to 
the Northwest and the Central regions. Th e reason for this 
was that previous research had shown that these were the 
most restrictive and the most lenient respectively.39 Later, the 
Southwest region was also included because the IND wanted 
to spread the burden of the research more evenly within the 
organization. At the unit level, selection took place solely in 
the Central region because the Northwest and the Southwest 
each had only one asylum unit. Th ree out of fi ve asylum 
units were selected in the Central region. One unit off ered 
to participate of its own volition; the others did so at my re-
quest. I did not know anything about the units beforehand. 
Everybody within the units was asked to participate except 
for the unit managers and the people who were still learning 
to do the job. Ninety-eight decision makers co-operated and 
the response rate was 94.2 per cent.
Research design
All ninety-eight respondents were presented the same fi c-
titious asylum application with the request to prepare a 
decision on the permit for temporary residence as asylum 
seeker (henceforth: asylum permit) and on the permit for 
residence as unaccompanied minor immigrant (henceforth: 
permit for minors). An interview followed shortly aft er, 
during which respondents were asked to explain their de-
cisions. During the interview, supplementary information 
about the application was presented and respondents were 
again asked to make both decisions. In addition, respond-
ents handed in a questionnaire that they completed before-
hand. Transcriptions of the interviews were made and, aft er 
coding the decisions, they were connected to the survey 
data. In an accompanying letter, which was also explained 
orally, respondents were urgently asked not to deliberate 
with anybody about the case, but instead to prepare it indi-
vidually. Th is was done to make sure that the decisions not 
only referred to an identical case but were also made under 
identical circumstances.
However, there were two disadvantages attached to this 
procedure. Th ey had to do with the possibility of generaliz-
ing the fi ndings to actual implementation practice. First, re-
spondents were not allowed to deliberate about the case with 
others, while in practice deliberation is an essential element 
of their work. Th is means that decisions are normally taken in 
a less individual fashion than in the present case. In addition, 
decisions are usually controlled. Th is means that mistakes 
can be corrected. However, it is not likely that these limita-
tions have had a huge impact on the fi ndings. Specifi cally, 
to the question whether internal control would have led to 
other decisions, only 2.5 per cent answered affi  rmatively and 
10 per cent did not preclude this. Th e great majority thought 
that this would not have led to other decisions.
Another disadvantage of the research procedure was that 
respondents knew that their decisions were based upon a 
fi ctitious case. Th e eff ect of this may have been that some 
decision makers did not prepare themselves as thoroughly 
on the fi ctitious case as they would have done on a real 
application. Th e fi rst thing that was done to limit this nega-
tive consequence was to limit the preparation time as much 
as possible. Th is was done by presenting just one applica-
tion, hence, a short one. Secondly, an attempt was made to 
make the application as realistic as possible, so that the re-
spondents would “forget” they were preparing a fi ctitious 
case. For example, the application was printed on paper 
with the logo of the Ministry of Justice, and as many stan-
dard phrases as possible were used. Also, real events and 
situations were processed in the application. Information 
was gathered from offi  cial messages, newspaper articles, 
and fi les of real asylum applications. Apparently, this suc-
ceeded well, because, when the interview was over, several 
respondents asked whether it concerned a “real” applica-
tion, although the accompanying letter stated that the case 
was fi ctitious.
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If it was so important to present a realistic application, 
why then was an existing one not used? I wanted to keep 
the chance on diff ering decisions in my own hands. I artifi -
cially increased the chance of fi nding diff ering decisions by 
increasing the number of decisions that had to be made on 
the application and by focusing the application on parts of 
the asylum policy that contain room for discretion.40 Th ese 
two strategies were eff ectuated in four ways.
Firstly, the application focused on an unaccompanied asy-
lum seeker who was older than sixteen on his arrival in the 
Netherlands, but was evidently younger than eighteen at the 
moment of data collection. Caseworkers have to test whether 
minors that are not eligible for an asylum permit are eligible 
for a permit for minors. Th is means that two decisions must 
be made with minor asylum seekers and just one with adults. 
However, the offi  cial test for minors is regulated in great 
detail and substantial room for discretion exists only with 
respect to applicants who fall within the category chosen 
here. With respect to this category, it has to be determined 
whether the person concerned is unaccompanied, independ-
ent, and if not, whether there are possibilities for reception in 
the country of origin. Th ese three tests all off er possibilities 
for diff erences in interpretation.
Th e second way was by building an extra phase into the 
research procedure. Respondents were asked to make deci-
sions not only aft er reading both interview reports, but also 
aft er reading the corrections and amendments to the reports. 
Th e total number of decision proposals came down to four 
because of the extra phase (the decision on the asylum per-
mit and permit for minors in the fi rst and second phase).
Th irdly, Chechnya was chosen as the region of origin. Th is 
federal republic is one of the few areas that is offi  cially con-
sidered unsafe, but to which categorical protection policy no 
longer applies. When a country has offi  cially been declared 
safe, asylum permits are rarely granted, while if a country 
applies for categorical protection, an asylum permit is auto-
matically granted unless contraindications are present or 
the identity or nationality of the applicant is doubted. So, 
Chechnya is a region of origin that off ers room for both 
grants and refusals. Th e fact that it is offi  cial policy to refuse 
refugees from Chechnya because they have a fl ight alterna-
tive somewhere else in the Russian Federation is not an in-
surmountable problem. Th is policy cannot be applied auto-
matically because it is also stated offi  cially that people with 
a Caucasian appearance can run into discrimination and, 
consequently, may be granted an asylum permit.
Th e last way is by focusing the application on trauma 
policy. Th is policy was revised profoundly with the intro-
duction of the Asylum Act 2000 and had not yet taken its 
defi nite shape in every aspect. Because the many questions 
caseworkers posed to the policy departments about the man-
ner in which the trauma policy should be applied to specifi c 
cases, complementary policy was made in the form of an-
swers to questions, memos, and a guideline. Furthermore, 
symposia were organized to explain this policy and a more 
elaborate version of it was in the pipeline (in the form of a 
so-called Intermediate Aliens Circular Message (TBV)). In 
the application, events were described to which concepts of 
the trauma policy like “severe abuse,” “non-criminal deten-
tion,” and “cause of departure” applied and which were oft en 
unclear to the personnel.
Operationalization
Two models were tested. Th e fi rst dealt with the explanation 
of procedural inequality (whether or not to take for granted 
the information provided on the application) and the second 
with the substantive inequality (refusing versus granting).
Taking for granted the information available about the asy-
lum application was measured on the bases of the decisions 
proposed on the fi ctitious case. With respect to both the asy-
lum permit and the permit for minors one could choose be-
tween not taking for granted the available information (i.e., 
postponing the decisions to complement or to verify this in-
formation) and taking it for granted (i.e., refusing or granting 
permits). People were fi rst asked to choose aft er reading an 
interview report about the nationality, identity, and journey 
of the applicant and one about his motives for fl eeing (phase 
one) and then again aft er reading corrections and amend-
ments to both reports (phase two). Table 1 shows that the 
decisions of the caseworkers diff er a lot. Th e four decisions 
were combined aft er a reliability test proved that this would 
result in an internally consistent measurement instrument 
(α=0.70). Th e factor loadings of the four decisions to either 
take the available information for granted or not are respect-
ively: asylum permit fi rst phase (0.61), permit for minors fi rst 
phase (0.82), asylum permit second phase (0.59), permit for 
minors second phase (0.87). Th e compounding of the four 
decisions resulted in fi ve categories that increasingly indicate 
an acceptance of taking the available information for granted: 
(i) postponing all four (18.4%); (ii) postponing three (3.1%); 
(iii) postponing two (29.6%); (iv) postponing one (26.5%); 
(v) postponing none of the four decisions (22.4%).
Perceived work pressure consists of a scale that is made up 
of fi ve items with “no” and “yes” as answering categories. Th is 
scale was taken from Jetten and Pat.41 Th is scale is internally 
consistent (α=0.76, see Appendix 1, Table 2). A high score 
means a lot of perceived work pressure.42
Th e reputation of the decision maker was measured with 
the help of six indicators for both positive and negative feed-
back on previous decisions. Positive feedback was measured 
with the number of compliments that respondents had re-
ceived since the introduction of the Aliens Act 2000 for grants 
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and refusals respectively. Th e percentage of compliments for 
grants and refusals respectively is distributed as follows: (i) 
zero times (79.8; 81.1); (ii) one time (7.4; 3.2); (iii) two times 
(7.4; 2.1); (iv) three to fi ve times (3.2; 7.4); (v) more than fi ve 
times (2.0; 6.3). Negative feedback was measured in the fi rst 
place on the basis of the number of times that an employee 
had to revise a decision under pressure from colleagues or 
superiors since the implementation of the Aliens Act 2000. 
Th is can either refer to the number of times that one granted 
under pressure from colleagues when one wanted to refuse 
originally, or to the number of times that one wanted to 
grant in fi rst instance but eventually refused. Th e answers to 
both questions are distributed as follows: (i) zero times (41.8; 
58.2); (ii) one time (30.6; 20.4); (iii) two times (19.4; 15.3); 
(iv) more than two times (8.2; 6.1). Furthermore, negative 
feedback was measured on the basis of the outcome of ap-
peals made by asylum seekers against refusals by the IND. 
Th is refers to the proportion of appeals granted by the IND 
and by the appellate court that decision makers knew of per-
sonally.43
Th e more compliments employees received, the less oft en 
they had to reverse decisions under pressure from colleagues 
or superiors; and the less oft en they were confronted with ap-
peals granted by the IND and by the appellate court, the bet-
ter their reputation. So, these six indicators were added up, 
aft er multiplying the scores for negative feedback by minus 
one, and aft er standardizing the scores. A high score indi-
cates a good reputation.
Experience distinguished less experienced employees who 
were not authorized to sign decisions (46.9 per cent) from 
experienced employees who were authorized to do so (53.1 
per cent).
Granting was measured on the basis of the four decisions 
proposed by the respondents with respect to the application. 
One could choose between refusing, postponing, and grant-
ing the asylum permit and the permit for minors in fi rst and 
second instance. Postponing can eventually result in either 
a refusal or a grant and is therefore defi ned as the middle 
category. An internally consistent scale was constructed by 
combining these four decisions (α=0.73). Th eir factor load-
ings were as follows: asylum permit fi rst phase (0.57); permit 
for minors fi rst phase (0.90); asylum permit second phase 
(0.56); permit for minors second phase (0.89). Th e scale con-
sists of the following nine categories, indicating increasingly 
the decision to grant permits. Th is variable is distributed as 
follows: (i) (7.1%); (ii) (16.3%); (iii) (21.4%); (iv) (7.1%); (v) 
(27.6%); (vi) (4.1%); (vii) (11.2%); (viii) (1.0%); (ix) (4.1%).
Th e preference for a lenient asylum policy consists of the 
combination of the fi ve following attitudes: preference for the 
further restriction of asylum policy, role defi nition as gate-
keeper, role defi nition as advocate, distrust in the credibility 
of asylum seekers, and formalism (see above). Th e internal 
consistency of the scales measuring these attitudes ranged 
from suffi  cient to good, with the exception of formalism (see 
Appendix 1, Table 3). Th e formalism scale was nonetheless 
used in the analysis because of the high factor loadings of all 
items.
Principal component analysis with the fi ve scales resulted 
in one factor with an Eigenvalue of more than 1. Th is factor 
explains 50 per cent of the total variance. Th is shows that 
the fi ve attitudes that are used alternately in the literature 
for the operationalization of role defi nition indeed correlate 
strongly, as expected. Th e factor loadings are: for the prefer-
ence of a restrictive asylum policy –0.87; for role defi nition 
as gatekeeper, –0.74; for role defi nition as advocate, 0.65; for 
distrust in the credibility of asylum seekers, –0.73; and for 
formalism, –0.48. Th e attitudes with negative factor loadings 
were multiplied by minus 1, so that a high score indicates a 
preference for a lenient asylum policy.
Reputation for being too restrictive has to do with the ex-
tent to which employees, according to others, refuse too oft en 
and do not grant oft en enough. Th is was measured with the 
help of the same six indicators that were used to measure the 
reputation for being a good decision maker (for the scores 
on these six items, see the operationalization of the latter 
variable). Th ese items were however categorized diff erently. 
Based on the presupposition that compliments are meant to 
stimulate manifested behaviour, this implies that the num-
ber of compliments for grants indicates a reputation for be-
ing too restrictive, while the reverse is true for refusals. Th e 
Table 1. Decisions on the asylum application (Frequencies, percentages, N=98).
After reading the reports After reading corrections and 
amendments
Asylum permit Permit for 
minors
Asylum permit Permit for 
minors
No 38.8 54.1  8.2 51.0
Maybe 48.0 29.6 66.3 33.7
Yes 13.3 16.3 25.5 15.3
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number of times that an employee granted under pressure 
from colleagues when one wanted to refuse originally indi-
cates a reputation for being too restrictive, while the reverse 
is true for the number of times that one wanted to grant in 
fi rst instance but eventually refused. Th e number of granted 
appeals or granted courts of appeal employees recalled by 
employees indicates a reputation for being too restrictive. 
Th ese six indicators were added up aft er multiplying the 
number of compliments for refusals and of the number of 
refusals under pressure from others by minus one, and aft er 
standardizing the scores. A high score indicates a reputation 
for being too restrictive.
Th e reputation of the decision maker multiplied by the pref-
erence for a lenient asylum policy is an interaction term that 
is incorporated in the model to see whether caseworkers ac-
commodate their decisions to a larger extent to their role def-
inition as they have a better reputation (hypothesis 4a).
Professional past within the judicial system was considered; 
6.1 per cent have worked in the past in the judicial system as 
(fraud) investigator or policy offi  cer, and 93.9 per cent have 
not.
Former asylum-seeker aid workers included 15.3 per cent 
who have helped asylum seekers either as volunteers or pro-
fessionals, and 84.7 per cent who have not.
Conservatism has to do with the rejection of cultural diff er-
ences. Th is variable consists of the combination of authoritar-
ianism, distrust in human nature, political party preference, 
and multiculturalism. “Authoritarianism” expresses the con-
viction that individuals should conform to formal rules and 
offi  cial authorities because otherwise they will admit to their 
destructive primal instincts and impulses. Th is was measured 
with the help of eight items, which are part of the F-scale for 
authoritarianism of Adorno et al.44 or of research that is based 
upon it, and produces an internally consistent scale (α=0.71, 
see Appendix 1, Table 4). Th is aversion to deviant behaviour 
implies simultaneously a distrust in human nature and, as 
research has demonstrated, a preference for right-wing par-
ties.45 Political party preference is measured on the basis 
of the question on which party one would vote for if there 
were elections for Parliament. Th e answers were categorized 
in ascending order with respect to conservatism: (i) Green 
Left  Party, Socialist Party, or considering either the Green 
Left  Party and the Social Democratic Party (34.6); (ii) Social 
Democratic Party or Democratic Party (32.6); (iii) Republican 
Party, Christian Democratic Party, Christian Union, doubters, 
and non-voters (32.6).46 Distrust in human nature is measured 
independently with the help of Wrightsman’s “Philosophy of 
human nature” scale (α=0.77).47 “Multiculturalism” consists 
of the conviction that foreigners are an improvement for so-
ciety instead of a threat. Th is scale is also internally consistent 
(α=0.73, see Appendix 1, Table 4).
Principal Component Analysis with all four measures re-
sulted in one factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.0. Th is factor ex-
plains 51.1 per cent of the total variance. Th e factor loadings 
of the diff erent components are as follows: authoritarianism, 
0.77; political party preference, 0.54; distrust in human na-
ture, 0.68; and multiculturalism, –0.86. Th e score for multi-
culturalism was multiplied by minus 1, so that a high score 
indicates conservatism.
Perceived economic threat concerns the estimation of the 
actual level of welfare and of the expected decrease of welfare 
in the future. Th is attitude was measured with the help of eight 
Likert items used previously in the survey “Cultural changes 
in the Netherlands 1992” (see Appendix 1, Table 5).48 Th e 
scale for perceived economic threat is suffi  ciently internally 
consistent (α=0.67).
Analytic Strategy
Th e hypotheses were tested by way of bivariate correla-
tions and multiple regressions. For reasons of readability 
two fi gures will be presented in the main text of the follow-
ing section that only depict the signifi cant beta coeffi  cients 
generated by the linear regressions (method “enter,” weight 
estimates “ordinary least squares”). More complete and de-
tailed results are presented in Appendix 2, Tables 6 and 7. 
Both tables show that the mutual correlations between the 
independent and intermediate variables did not have an un-
usually large eff ect on the results and did not cause problems 
with multicollinearity. Both tables show that correlations be-
tween the independent and intermediate variables did not 
have a distorting eff ect on the results. Th is can be deduced 
from the fact that the correlations and beta coeffi  cients of 
the three models tested resemble each other with respect to 
direction and strength. Moreover, test results incorporated 
in both tables demonstrate that multicollinearity has not 
infl uenced the reliability of the results negatively. As a rule 
of thumb, “variance infl ation factors” (VIF) of more than 10 
indicate problems with multicollinearity.49 Th e value of all 
explaining variables is below 2.5. In short: the results shown 
in Appendix 2 make clear that the results depicted in both 
fi gures to follow are robust and consistent.
Findings
Procedural Inequality
Th e explanation of the extent to which decision makers take 
the information that is available on the asylum application for 
granted is depicted in Figure 1. It shows that the more work 
pressure employees perceive the more willing they are to take 
this information for granted. In correspondence with hypoth-
esis 1a it is true that employees are less willing to spend time 
and energy to complementing or verify information about an 
asylum application as they perceive more work pressure.
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However, hypothesis 1b was rejected. Experienced work-
ers do indeed perceive less work pressure than do those with 
less experience (β=–0.16), but this eff ect is (just) not signifi -
cant (p=0.10). A possible explanation for this is that experi-
enced employees have more tasks and responsibilities than 
the less experienced. In fact, an extra task that the experi-
enced workers have is the checking of the work of their less 
experienced colleagues. Th us, it is possible that experience 
decreases work pressure, but that this is compensated for by 
the fact that it leads to new tasks and responsibilities.
Hypothesis 2 was also rejected. Employees are indeed 
more willing to take the available information for granted 
as their reputation is better (β=0.17), but this eff ect is (just) 
not signifi cant (p=0.11). Indirectly, a good reputation has 
a reverse eff ect. Aft er all, the perceived work pressure that 
increases the chance of taking the available information for 
granted is least among the employees with the best reputa-
tions. Th is is understandable because employees need less 
time to process the criticism they receive on their decisions 
as their reputation is better. Th is leaves caseworkers with the 
best reputations the most time to test the uncorroborated 
presuppositions about the eligibility of the application or to 
verify the information that the interested asylum seeker has 
provided. Th is diff erence can occur because the caseload of 
the caseworkers is not adapted to the amount of feedback 
they receive on their decisions. So, an unintended conse-
quence of feedback is that employees are more inclined to 
take for granted the information that is obtainable on an asy-
lum application because it takes time to process it.
Experience, reputation, and work pressure explain seven 
per cent of the total variance of taking for granted the ready 
information on an asylum application.
Substantive Inequality
Figure 2 depicts the explanation of the diff erences in fi nal 
decisions. It shows that supporters of a lenient asylum policy 
grant most oft en. Th is corresponds with hypothesis 3a. Th e 
preference for a lenient asylum policy is greatest among em-
ployees with a past as asylum-seeker aid worker and among 
liberal employees. Th ese fi ndings confi rm hypotheses 3d and 
3e. Th is means that the personal preference for the imple-
mentation of asylum policy has an eff ect on the outcome of 
the asylum decision and that role defi nition is dependent on 
the political and professional background of the caseworker.
Hence, hypotheses 3b, 3c, and 3f were rejected. Contrary 
to hypothesis 3b, experienced workers do not oppose a leni-
ent asylum policy more than inexperienced ones. In other 
words, people with much experience are not more nega-
tive and cynical towards asylum seekers than people with 
little experience. Th e absence of this diff erence might be ex-
plained by the fast turnover of personnel within the IND. It 
is plausible that especially highly motivated people stay the 
Figure 1. Explanation of the extent to which decision makers take the information that is available on an asylum application for granted 
based on perceived work pressure, reputation, and experience (Betas, N=97).
171
 Explaining Inequality in the Implementation of Asylum Law 
Refuge25-2.indd   171 5/25/10   5:52:34 PM
longest and that those who become cynical because of the 
stories “they have heard so oft en already” leave the organ-
ization quickly. So, it is possible that experience does lead to 
role defi nition as “hard-liner,” as was expected, but that this 
infl uence is invisible in organizations with a high turnover, 
because of the self-selection of employees.
Hypothesis 3c was rejected because a professional past 
within the judicial system leads to refusing independently of 
role defi nition, while it was predicted that this would be so 
because of an aversion to a lenient asylum policy. Even now 
that this is known, it is not easy to understand why it is so, 
for this direct eff ect can not have anything to do with the fact 
that these people have become more distrustful towards asy-
lum seekers because this is an element of role defi nition.
Contrary to hypothesis 3f, fear for economic deteri-
oration does not lead to favouring a lenient asylum policy. 
Although the negative correlation between both attitudes is 
considerable (r =–0.27; p < 0.01; not depicted in Figure 2), 
this eff ect completely disappears when controlling for con-
servatism. Th is means opposition to a lenient asylum policy 
is entirely caused by the fact that there are many conserva-
tives among the employees who perceive much economic 
threat. Perceived economic threat does have an independ-
ent eff ect on the rejection of a lenient asylum policy among 
the general public,50 although the eff ect of conservatism and 
negative stereotyping of foreigners is much stronger. Hence 
economic motivations do not have an eff ect on either the ra-
cism of pupils51 or on negative attitudes towards ethnic min-
orities,52 while opposing cultural diff erences do have these 
eff ects. Th is means, in fact, that the rejection of hypothesis 3f 
in combination with the affi  rmation of hypothesis 3e under-
lines that the attitude toward cultural diff erences determines 
negative attitudes towards aliens to a greater extent than eco-
nomic motives.
Next, hypotheses 4a and 4b, with respect to the infl uence 
of the reputation on the fi nal decisions, are affi  rmed. Attitude 
Figure 2. Explanation of diff erences in deciding to grant a permit based on role defi nition, quality and kind of reputation, and 
 background characteristics (Betas, N=97).
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towards the implementation of asylum policy has a greater 
impact on the outcome of the decisions made as the reputa-
tion of the employee is better. Th is means that caseworkers 
get more discretion to decide as they please, as their repu-
tation is better. Th e sort of reputation also has an eff ect on 
the fi nal decision. Employees who are known to be too re-
strictive grant most oft en, while the reverse is true for the 
employees with a reputation for being too open-handed. Th is 
means that employees accommodate their actual decisions 
to the feedback that they got on previous decisions. In other 
words, this feedback restrains them from deviating too much 
from dominating decision norms. However, both eff ects are 
not very strong. Th e operationalization of the reputation of 
the decision makers possibly shows why not. It shows that 
decision makers do not get much feedback on their previous 
decisions: they rarely revise their decisions under pressure 
from colleagues or superiors, they receive even fewer com-
pliments on their decisions, and it is really exceptional that 
they are aware of the outcome of appeals made against their 
own decisions. So, one can assume that the infl uence of the 
reputation on the outcome of decisions increases as the feed-
back is intensifi ed.
Altogether, role defi nition, professional background, pol-
itical attitudes, and reputation explain over 16 per cent of the 
total variance in the decisions to grant permits.
Complementary Explanation
Th e qualitative interviews about the case exposed yet an-
other cause of substantive inequality. Th is is the application 
of semi-offi  cial policy such as memos and policy guidelines. 
Th e next example is about the application of internal memos. 
Several people working in the Central region refused an asy-
lum permit based on the trauma policy because they thought 
that the applicant did not meet the criteria for serious abuse 
enumerated in an internal memo. Th e criteria were that the 
person in question had to have undergone treatment by a 
physician and had to have been unable to work or to func-
tion normally for at least six weeks. Th is memo did not exist 
in the other regions and, consequently, many caseworkers in 
the other regions granted an asylum permit because of the 
abuses the applicant had undergone during his detention.
Th e second example shows that also the answers of policy 
departments to questions asked by individual employees 
about the way sections of the policy should be applied to 
specifi c cases lead to substantive inequality. An employee 
decided to grant an asylum permit based on trauma policy 
because of the answer of a policy department to a question 
of hers. She had asked whether traumatizing events that take 
place during the fl ight could ever lead to a permit. Th e na-
tional policy department answered that this is possible. She 
then granted an asylum permit because, in the fi le of the ap-
plicant, it was written that he was forced through a mine-
fi eld during his fl ight. However, the majority did not even 
consider this event because they assumed that traumatizing 
events could only result in a permit when they were the dir-
ect motive to fl ee.
Th ere are two reasons why not everybody conforms to the 
answers of policy departments. Th e fi rst is because usually 
only one or two people know of an answer. Answers are not 
fed back systematically. Secondly, employees tend to consider 
the answers more as advice than as coercive guidelines. Th is 
can be explained by the fact that according to the casework-
ers the answers are frequently ambiguous or contradictory. 
Consequently, they feel more or less free to choose whether 
or not to act in line with the answer.
In short, in addition to the personal characteristics of 
the decision makers, the selective application of semi-offi  -
cial policy also causes inequality in the execution of asylum 
policy.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Th is research demonstrated that the implementation of asy-
lum policy is accompanied with procedural and substan-
tive inequality. Some decision makers decide to postpone 
decisions to complement or verify the information that is 
available on an asylum application, while others take this in-
formation for granted. Hence, some decision makers grant 
a permit on this application while others refuse it. In itself 
these fi ndings prove little about the extent of both forms of 
inequality in the implementation of asylum policy because 
the case that was presented to the decision makers was de-
liberately constructed to maximize the chance of diff ering 
decisions. However, in combination with the studies cited in 
the introduction these fi ndings indicate that both forms of 
inequality are no exception.
Current study also showed that the working conditions 
and the characteristics of individual employees cause both 
forms of inequality. Procedural inequality is caused by per-
ceived work pressure. In particular, employees who perceive 
much work pressure decide to take the information that is 
available on an application for granted, and work pressure 
is highest among employees with the worst reputations. Th e 
latter need the most time to process criticism on their pre-
vious decisions so they have the least time left  for comple-
menting and verifying information on asylum applications. 
Substantive inequality is caused by the attitude, background, 
and reputation of caseworkers. Supporters of a lenient asy-
lum policy grant residence permits most oft en. Th is role def-
inition is most common among employees who have worked 
as asylum-seeker aid workers and among liberals. Employees 
with a professional past within the judicial system are most 
inclined to refuse permits independent of their role defi n-
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ition. Hence, role defi nition has more eff ect on the fi nal de-
cision, as the reputation of a decision maker is better. Th is 
means that employees get more discretion to decide as they 
please, as their reputation is better. Employees are also more 
likely to grant a permit as their reputation for being a too 
restrictive decision maker is stronger. Th is means that feed-
back prevents employees from deviating too much from the 
dominant decision norms. Finally, substantive inequality de-
pends also on semi-offi  cial policy guidelines that are location 
specifi c and that are applied selectively.
So the implementation of asylum policy results in system-
atic diff erences. One could dispute the societal importance of 
this conclusion by reasoning that the decisions of the IND 
employees are not fi nal: asylum seekers can appeal negative 
decisions in court. However, the appeal procedure does not 
guarantee unambiguous outcomes. Aft er all, it has occurred, 
for example, that trial judges base their own decisions on pre-
vious ones. Th ey are more likely to sentence when they have 
read the charges before the trial, than when they have not.53 
Th e reason for this is that in countries like Germany and the 
Netherlands the charges do not contain the demurrer of the 
defendant. And although fi les of asylum applications do con-
tain the point of view of the asylum seeker, the communica-
tion within the asylum procedure usually has a negative ef-
fect on the representation of asylum seekers.54 Hence, trial 
judges, as well as immigration offi  cials,55 are not only inclined 
to stick to previous decisions because they base their deci-
sions on selective information but also because this is most 
effi  cient. Th is is what Lipsky56 called “rubber-stamping.” On 
the basis of these fi ndings, it is to be expected that judges 
are also inclined to go along with the decisions of the IND, 
as Spijkerboer57 has argued with respect to the Dutch High 
Court. And, indeed, research has demonstrated that appeals 
do not decrease regional diff erences in the execution of asy-
lum policy in the Netherlands.58 So, it is not at all sure that 
systematic diff erences dissolve because of the right to make 
an appeal in court.
Th is means that it is logical to try to cancel out the causes 
of procedural and substantive inequality at the source. Which 
points of departure do the fi ndings of this study off er to 
achieve this? Recruiting and selecting can help to establish a 
balanced staff  with respect to role defi nition, political attitudes, 
and professional background. However, the best possibility to 
advance the unequivocal implementation of asylum policy is 
probably by intensifying feedback on decisions. Aft er all, the 
limited amount of feedback that decision makers receive al-
ready decreases the impact of their role defi nition on decisions 
and causes them to conform to the dominant decision norms. 
Th ese eff ects can be enlarged by complimenting caseworkers 
more oft en, making them revise their decisions more oft en if 
internal control gives rise to this, and confronting them sys-
tematically with the outcome of appeals made against their 
own decisions. It would also help if the answers given by policy 
departments to questions about the way policy sections should 
be applied in specifi c cases were fed back systematically and if 
it would be made clear what the status of these answers is.
However, if the intensifi cation of feedback were not com-
bined with measures to decrease work pressure, then it would 
result in less careful decisions. Aft er all, such feedback would 
be at the expense of the time that employees have left  to com-
plement and verify the information that is available on an asy-
lum application. First of all, work pressure can be diminished 
by stopping early the slimming down of the IND because of 
the decreasing infl ux of asylum seekers since 2000.59 Another 
possibility is to reverse the sharp increase in the percentage 
of applications that is decided on in the fast-track proced-
ure instead of the normal procedure. Nowadays manifestly 
unfounded claims and claims deemed not to require “time-
consuming investigation” enter the fast-track procedure. 
However, as a result of the vagueness of the parameters de-
fi ning who should enter this procedure, in combination with 
the emphasis put on effi  ciency in the present political climate, 
applications are included in the fast track that do not belong 
there.60 And because these applications have to be decided on 
within forty-eight working hours, this implies that casework-
ers have insuffi  cient time to investigate the eligibility of these 
applications and that the asylum seekers have insuffi  cient 
time to prepare themselves for the interviews and to collect 
evidence to substantiate their claims. Th e tightening of the 
criteria to include applications in the fast track can help to 
prevent decisions being made on the basis of uncorroborated 
presuppositions and unverifi ed information because they are 
made under too much work pressure.
In any case, the recommendations are no plea against 
discretion as such. Asylum policy cannot possibly anticipate 
all unique characteristics of individual asylum applications 
while these characteristics can defi nitely be relevant for the 
eligibility of the applications. Th erefore, it is desirable to 
give decision makers the freedom to take into account these 
unique factors when making decisions. What has to be pre-
vented, though, is that identical applications are decided 
upon diff erently because of the use of discretion, because 
“where workers’ discretion leads to unfair and unequal treat-
ment of clients, with no compensation benefi ts, it should be 
desirable to reform systems by removing this unredeemed 
source of unfairness.”61 Th is certainly applies to the execu-
tion of asylum policy that can have huge consequences for 
the people involved.
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Appendix 1
Factor and reliability analyses measurement  instruments
Table 2. Factor and reliability analysis of perceived work pressure (Percentages, factor loadings, 
and Cronbachs alpha).
% yes Fl
Do you have to work fast?
Do you have to do a lot of work?
Would you like to calm down in your work?
Do you generally have enough time to fi nish your work?
Do you work under time pressure?
32.7
43.8
73.5
83.7
52.6
0.82
0.70
0.82
-0.54
0.67
Cronbachs alpha 0.76
Table 3. Factor and reliability analysis of the preference for a lenient asylum policy (Percentages, fi rst 
and second-order factor loadings, and Cronbachs alphas).
% agree 
(strongly)
Fl
Support for a restrictive asylum policy
The asylum procedure in our country attracts newcomers.
A restrictive asylum policy is in the interest of genuine refugees.
The High Court is too much on the side of the IND.
The benefi t of the doubt should be applied more often.
Too many asylum seekers who are not eligible obtain a residence permit.
The Dutch government should do more to deter asylum seekers from coming to our country.
10.4
63.2
4.2
21.7
27.7
16.6
0.66
0.62
-0.50
-0.47
0.79
0.69
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
0.74
-0.87
Distrust of the credibility of asylum seekers
Solicitors ascribe contradictions in interview reports too easily to cultural differences, lan-
guage problems, or the bad health of the asylum seeker.
Many inconsistencies in reports of asylum seekers are caused by communication problems.
Asylum seekers know exactly what to say to get a residence permit.
Asylum seekers exaggerate their problems during interviews.
Legal aid represents the interests of asylum seekers too one-sidedly.
The asylum policy forces asylum seekers more or less to lie about documents and journey.
Asylum seekers who bring to the fore essential information later on in the procedure usually 
have good reasons to do so.
43.9
18.3
29.6
47.4
20.7
20.4
9.2
0.56
-0.55
0.53
0.57
0.70
-0.51
-0.69
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
0.68
-0.73
Table 3 (cont’d)
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% agree 
(strongly)
Fl
Defi ning role as gatekeeper
If the IND did not exist, then the Netherlands would be fl ooded with immigrants.
If we apply the rules leniently, the housing of asylum seekers would quickly become un-
affordable.
Politicians have denied for too long that the Netherlands is too small and too full to afford an 
open-handed asylum policy.
A restrictive asylum policy is necessary to take the pressure off the spending of public 
money.
The economic value of asylum seekers should never play a role in the asylum policy.
A lenient immigration policy results in a situation in which social services like unemployment 
benefi ts and rent subsidy become unaffordable.
37.2
44.3
22.7
36.7
74.5
16.5
  0.42
  0.79
  0.72
  0.75
-0.39
  0.87
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
 0.74
-0.74
Formalism
There ought to be a possibility for employees to refuse to agree to decisions they are princi-
pally opposed to.
The intent of the law is more important than the letter of the law.
A personal interpretation of the rules is not necessarily wrong.
The only possibility of taking a good decision is to imagine the person behind the asylum 
seeker.
The literal application of all regulations does not always result in the best decision.
68.0
55.8
43.9
78.6
29.6
-0.41
-0.72
-0.61
-0.55
-0.67
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
0.53
-0.48
Defi ning role as advocate
Internationally the Netherlands should lead the way in the protection of human rights.
The Refugee Convention and the European Convention of Human Rights represents one of 
the most fundamental democratic values there is.
The Netherlands should defi nitely remain a safe haven for people persecuted in other coun-
tries.
The importance of the protection of human rights vanishes in the present political climate.
Abolishing the Refugee Convention would mean a setback for our present civilization. 
60.2
75.5
96.9
56.2
68.4
0.64
0.66
0.72
0.61
0.72
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
0.68
0.65
Eigenvalue second-order factor
Percentage of the variance explained by the second-order factor
2.5
50.0
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Table 4. Factor and reliability analysis for conservatism (Percentages, fi rst 
and second-order factor loadings, and Cronbachs alphas).
% agree 
(strongly)
Fl
Authoritarianism
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up, they ought to get over 
them and settle down.
What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, 
tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.
Because of fast changes, it is diffi cult to know what is right and wrong.
People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral, 
crooked, and feebleminded people.
Most people disappoint when you get to know them better.
If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
Because of the many opinions about good and evil, it is unclear what to do.
13.2
7.2
12.2
3.1
6.1
3.0
10.3
7.2
0.66
0.46
0.51
0.59
0.54
0.58
0.75
0.46
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
0.71
0.78
Distrust in human nature
Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they’re afraid of getting caught.
People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off by lying.
It’s pathetic to see an unselfi sh person in today’s world, because so many people take ad-
vantage of him.
Most people would cheat on their income tax if they could gain by it.
“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is a motto that most people follow
People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty, but few people stick to 
them when the chips are down.
Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.
People pretend to care more about another than they really do.
15.3
8.2
27.6
28.6
27.6
32.7
40.8
27.6
 0.69
-0.47
 0.49
 0.58
-0.62
 0.69
 0.68
 0.74
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
 0.77
 0.68
Multiculturalism
Having many cultural groups in the Netherlands makes it diffi cult to develop a sense of unity.
I fi nd it hard to show understanding for customs of ethnic minorities.
Dutch people can learn a lot of good things from ethnic minorities.
The mixing of different minority groups unavoidably causes problems.
Marriages between partners with a different ethnic background are doomed to fail.
In the present political climate too much emphasis is laid upon the problems caused by 
foreigners.
43.9
4.1
64.3
53.1
4.1
57.1
-0.68
-0.75
 0.75
-0.56
-0.69
 0.55
Cronbachs alpha
Second-order factor loading
 0.73
-0.86
Political party preference
Second-order factor loading  0.67
Eigenvalue second-order factor
Percentage of the variance explained by the second-order factor
  1.8
60.1
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Table 5. Factor and reliability analysis of perceived economic threat (Percentages, factor loadings, 
and Cronbachs alpha).
% agree 
(strongly)
Fl
In the future, I will be able to afford less luxury.
Sometimes I worry that I will have to change my present way of living.
The future will be better for the people than the present.
My welfare will decrease in the coming years.
The government does enough to increase the welfare of people like me.
In one year, the economic situation in our country will have worsened.
In the near future, there will be an economic crisis with high unemployment.
Our country is wealthy at the moment.
26.5
17.3
6.1
24.5
21.4
46.9
16.5
95.9
0.61
0.40
0.48
0.65
-0.38
0.64
0.66
-0.56
Cronbachs alpha 0.67
Appendix 2 Regression analyses and test for multicollinearity
Table 6. Explanation of the extent to which decision makers take the information that is present on an asylum 
application for granted based on perceived work pressure, reputation, and experience (Correlates, bèta’s, 
and variation infl ation factors, N=97).
r 1 2  3
VIF
Perceived work pressure
Experienced employees
Quality reputation decision maker
   0.18**
0.08
0.10
   0.18**
0.08
0.10
  0.24**
0.12
0.17
1.0
1.1
1.1
R2% 3.1 1.7 7.0
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05
Table 7. Explanation of differences in deciding to grant a permit based on role defi nition, quality and kind of 
reputation, and background characteristics (Correlations, bèta’s, and variation infl ation factors, N=97).
r 1 2  3
VIF
Preference lenient asylum policy
Quality reputation
Preference lenient asylum policy X quality reputation
Reputation for being too restrictive
Experienced employees
Professional past within the judicial system
Former aid worker asylum seekers
Perceived economic threat
Conservatism
    0.17**
-0.11
   0.16*
 0.11
-0.06
   -0.21**
-0.08
-0.03
-0.02
  0.18*
-0.06
    0.23**
 0.17
-0.03
   -0.24**
-0.06
-0.03
 0.10
   0.28**
-0.01
   0.21*
   0.20*
-0.07
   -0.22**
-0.08
-0.01
 0.24
2.0
1.3
1.2
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.1
1.3
2.4
R2% 9.5 5.7 17.4
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05
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